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Decision making often involves choosing between
small, short-term rewards and large, long-term
rewards. All animals, humans included, discount
future rewards—the present value of delayed
r e w a r d si sv i e w e da sl e s st h a nt h ev a l u eo f
immediate rewards. Despite its ubiquity, there
exists considerable but unexplained variation
between species in their capacity to wait
for rewards—that is, to exert patience or self-
control. Using two closely related primates—
common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus)a n d
cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus)—we
uncover a variable that may explain differences
in how species discount future rewards. Both
species faced a self-control paradigm in which
individuals chose between taking an immediate
small reward and waiting a variable amount of
time for a large reward. Under these conditions,
marmosets waited signiﬁcantly longer for food
than tamarins. This difference cannot be
explained by life history, social behaviour or
brain size. It can, however, be explained by
feeding ecology: marmosets rely on gum, a food
product acquired by waiting for exudate to ﬂow
from trees, whereas tamarins feed on insects,
a food product requiring impulsive action. Fora-
ging ecology, therefore, may provide a selective
pressure for the evolution of self-control.
Keywords: temporal discounting; impulsivity;
rate maximization; tamarins; marmosets
1. INTRODUCTION
How individuals discount or devalue future rewards
has intrigued economists, psychologists and beha-
vioural ecologists under a number of different guises.
Researchers studying temporal discounting often have
subjects choose between small, immediate and large,
delayed rewards to assess whether they can exhibit
self-control by waiting for the delayed reward, or
whether they discount the value of the delayed reward
and select the immediate reward. Economists have
examined discounting as a crucial factor in construct-
ing models of how humans assign utility to rewards
available over different time-scales (Frederick et al.
2002). Psychologists commonly use self-control para-
digms to investigate the cognitive mechanisms associ-
ated with delayed gratiﬁcation and impulsivity in
humans and non-human animals (Logue 1988).
Behavioural ecologists investigate rate maximization
to elucidate the role of evolutionary pressures inﬂuen-
cing animal foraging ecology (Kacelnik 2003). These
three perspectives converge in their ﬁnding that the
speed with which individuals devalue delayed rewards
(the ‘discounting level’) can vary tremendously
between species, between individuals, across the
lifetime of a single individual, and even in different
contexts for the same individual. Why does this
variation exist? Researchers suggest that some of this
variation could result from differences in the rate of
interruptions (Sozou 1998) or general cognitive
ability (Tobin et al. 1996). Understanding the source
of this variation could help elucidate the causes of
impulsivity and self-control.
Here, we examine discounting behaviour in two
cooperatively breeding New World monkeys—com-
mon marmosets and cotton-top tamarins. These
species have comparable body and brain size,
behaviour, mating systems and life history trajec-
tories (table 1). Given the similarities and relatively
close phylogenetic relationship between these species,
o n em i g h tn o te x p e c ts u b s t a n t i a ld i f f e r e n c e si n
cognitive abilities such as discounting. A closer look
at their foraging ecology, however, reveals one factor
that might favour different discounting functions: in
general, marmosets are signiﬁcantly more gummivor-
ous when compared with tamarins (approximately
70% versus 14% of feeding time, respectively;
Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson & Rylands 1988),
whereas tamarins are more insectivorous. Gummiv-
ory requires scratching tree bark and then waiting
for the sap to ﬂow, while insectivory favours immedi-
ate acquisition of an ephemeral food source.
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
To evaluate the discounting behaviour of both species, we used an
adjusting-delay, self-control procedure (Mazur 1987). Captive-born
subjects, with no foraging-relevant experience, chose between two
tools, one containing a small, immediate reward and the other
containing a large, delayed reward (ﬁgure 1). We presented each
subject with a series of 15–32 experimental sessions composed of
10 choice trials. In each trial, a subject selected between two
options, the ‘standard’ option of two food pellets with no delay and
the ‘adjusting’ option of six food pellets with variable delay.
Initially, there was no delay between pulling either tool and
receiving access to the food. If the subject preferred the larger
reward, we incremented the delay to the large reward by 1 s on the
subsequent session. If the subject preferred the small reward, we
decreased the delay to the large reward by 1 s. If the subject
selected the two amounts equally often, the delay to the large
reward remained the same. Using this method, we titrated the delay
time to ﬁnd each subject’s indifference point—the point at which
subjects equally valued the smaller, immediate reward and larger,
delayed reward (see Electronic Appendix).
3. RESULTS
On average, tamarins showed indifference between
the amounts when the six pellets were delayed for
a mean (Gs.e.) of 7.9G0.6 s, whereas marmosets
waited 14.4G1.5 s (ﬁgure 2), a signiﬁcantly longer
delay (F1,7Z 13.51, p! 0.01). The indifference
points for individual tamarins ranged from 5.6 to
9.8 s, and for marmosets from 10.0 to 19.0 s;
the most self-controlled tamarin waited less than the
most impulsive marmoset. We next turn to an analysis
of why such species differences may have evolved.
Body condition (body weight/tibia length) did not
signiﬁcantly correlate with indifference points for
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2Z0.33, pZ0.31) or tamarins
(r
2Z0.01, pZ0.89), excluding the inﬂuence of
motivational state on choice behaviour. Some
researchers suggest that the level of discounting may
decrease with the ratio of brain size to body weight
(Tobin et al. 1996). This explanation cannot account
for our differences in discounting, as the brain : body
ratio of tamarins (0.026) is almost identical to that of
marmosets (0.027; Stephan et al. 1981).
To quantitatively assess how the marmosets and
tamarins devalue rewards over time, we tested
whether the patterns of discounting ﬁt predictions
made by the rate maximization model of discounting.
Rate maximization theory predicts that foragers opti-
mize the gain in reward per unit time (Stephens &
Krebs 1986); therefore, individuals should maximize
the ﬁtness value (V) of a choice VZA/(tCh), where
A is the reward amount, t is the delay to reward
following choice and h is the time required to
process/handle the reward. Note that this function
describes only short-term gain, omitting the time
between choices. Despite its intuitive appeal, psychol-
ogists and behavioural ecologists have demonstrated
that animals tend to ignore the inter-choice interval,
maximizing intake over the short-term rather than the
long-term (Bateson & Kacelnik 1996; Stephens &
Anderson 2001). Rate maximization predicts indiffer-
ence between the small and large rewards in our
design when intake rate of the standard option equals
that of the adjusting option: As/(tsChs)ZAa/(taCha).
Given the values from table 2, we can estimate the
predicted indifference point (ta) if the subjects maxi-
mize intake rate. Because of differences in handling
time between species, rate maximization predicts an
indifference point of 8.6 s for tamarins and 6.6 s for
marmosets (table 2). While the marmosets waited
longer than expected by the rate maximization model
(t8Z4.5, p!0.01), the tamarins’ mean indifference
point did not differ from the rate maximization
prediction (t10ZK0.1, pZ0.91). Thus, the tamarins
appear to maximize their short-term intake rate,
whereas the marmosets have a longer time horizon,
resulting in more self-controlled choices.
4. DISCUSSION
The striking difference in discounting behaviour
between tamarins and marmosets is surprising given
their close phylogenetic relationship and comparable
biology. The two species share similar mating sys-
tems, group sizes, cooperative behaviours and general
ecology (table 1). We suggest that a key difference
between these species—their feeding ecology—may
explain this difference.
Relative to other factors, ecological differences
between species have been little explored as a selec-
tive pressure on discounting. As noted, one signiﬁcant
ecological difference between marmosets and tamar-
ins is their diet. Although both species feed on fruit,
marmosets specialize on plant exudates whereas
tamarins focus more on insects (Coimbra-Filho &
Mittermeier 1976; Snowdon & Soini 1988; Stevenson
& Rylands 1988). Feeding on insects may require
greater impulsivity to take advantage of ephemeral
bouts of availability. Foraging on exudates has led to
a number of specialized adaptations in marmosets
such as modiﬁed teeth for gouging and modiﬁed
digestive physiology (Coimbra-Filho & Mittermeier
1976; Harrison & Tardif 1994; Power & Oftedal
1996). Harrison & Tardif (1994) also contend that
the concentrated nature of gum-exuding feeding sites
may reduce gummivore home range sizes, possibly
accounting for the differences between tamarins and
marmosets. We contend that gummivory may have
led to cognitive specializations as well. Because feed-
ing on exudates requires waiting for gum and sap to
ooze out of the plants, marmosets may have evolved
the ability to value future rewards more than the
insectivorous tamarins. Therefore, the self-control
needed to feed on gums may have selected for a more
general ability to delay gratiﬁcation. The question
remains: did selection increase impulsivity in
Table 1. Comparison of traits for tamarins and marmosets.










c 11.7 yrs 13.5 yrs
home range size
d 7.8–10 ha 0.5–5 ha
habitat
d lower to mid-canopy of
Colombian rainforest





d monogamy, occasional polyandry monogamy
parental care







percentage time feeding on gum
d 14%
e 70%
a Stephan et al. (1981).
b Note that these values are estimates from Stephan et al. (1981) to correlate with their measures of brain size. Weights for our subjects can
be found in the Electronic Appendix.
c Ross (1991).
d Snowdon & Soini (1988) and Stevenson & Rylands (1988).
e No data available for Saguinus oedipus, therefore we used a measurement for closely related Saguinus geoffreyi.
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our ﬁnding that tamarins’ feeding rate maximizes but
marmosets are more self-controlled than expected, it
appears as though selection probably favoured self-
control in the marmosets.
The role of feeding ecology in cognition has been
documented in other species. Species that cache food
have better spatial memory (Balda & Kamil 1989)
and larger hippocampal volume (Basil et al. 1996)
than closely related non-caching species. In addition,
fruit-eating primates, such as spider monkeys, have
larger brains than leaf-eating species such as howler
monkeys, presumably to track spatial and temporal
variation in fruit distribution (Milton 1981). The
present study, however, provides the ﬁrst indication
that diet may inﬂuence animal discounting levels.
If this model generalizes beyond the current ﬁndings,
animals with long food processing times would exhibit
more self-control than those with short processing
times (but travelling time should not affect discount-
ing). Therefore, we predict that species that must
wait for food sources (e.g. gummivores, stalking
predators) should have longer time horizons and
lower discounting levels than species which immedi-
ately consume ephemeral food sources (e.g. frugi-
vores, opportunistic predators); these ecological
pressures may be so fundamental that even under
captive conditions, innate species-speciﬁc differences
are nonetheless maintained.
While highlighting differences in discounting levels
between marmosets and tamarins in the context of
foraging, our data do not necessarily imply a difference
across all situations. In fact, selection may act on
discounting levels in different contexts independently.
For example, although tamarins and marmosets value
food differently over time, they may value reproductive
opportunities equally, given their similar mating sys-
tems. Yet, in more promiscuous systems in which each
reproductive attempt is more valuable, individuals
may act more impulsively in their mating decisions.
Wilson & Daly (2004) provide data illustrating how
discounting might interact with reproduction in
humans by demonstrating that men discount mon-
etary rewards more highly following the presentation
of attractive female faces, but not unattractive faces.
They conclude that the possibility of mating
makes men more impulsive. Studies that correlate
discounting levels across contexts are needed to
determine the domain speciﬁcity of these cognitive
adaptations.
One alternative explanation of our ﬁndings is that
rather than having different discounting levels, tamar-
ins and marmosets value the food differently—that is,
perhaps marmosets value six pellets as more than
Figure 1. Experimental apparatus for discounting pro-
cedure. Both marmosets and tamarins experience the same
choices: pulling one of two tools. One tool yielded two food
pellets after no delay, and the other tool yielded six food
pellets after a longer delay. Transparent Plexiglas covers













































Figure 2. Species differences in discounting levels. Marmo-
sets and tamarins differed in their indifference points with
marmosets waiting almost twice as long for the six pellets
than tamarins. The tamarin indifference point does not
differ from that expected, but marmosets exhibit more self-
control than predicted by short-term rate maximization.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean indifference
points.










standard amount (As) 2 pellets 2 pellets
adjusting amount (Aa) 6 pellets 6 pellets
standard delay (ts)
a 0.1 s 0.1 s
standard handling time (hs)
a 10.7 s 8.3 s
adjusted handling time (ha)




8.6 s 6.6 s
observed mean indifference
point
7.9 s 14.4 s
a See Electronic Appendix for calculations of these estimates.
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will wait longer for them. While difﬁcult to rule
out, this alternative seems unlikely given that
motivational measures which would temporarily
inﬂuence value (such as body condition) did not
correlate with individual indifference points. What
remains are inherent differences in value functions
between species, which are notoriously difﬁcult to
describe. Further work on varying quantities and
qualities offood, as well as different methods of delaying
access to food, is needed to disentangle the complex
interaction between inherent value and temporal
discounting.
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